# ECON 491: Market Failures & Remedies Course Syllabus

### Théo Durandard

Spring 2025

#### **Basic Information**

Credits: 3 undergraduate hours, or 4 graduate hours

Meeting Times: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 11:00AM - 12:20PM

Instructor: Théo Durandard Email: theod@illinois.edu

Office Hours: Wednesdays,  $10:00\mathrm{AM}$  -  $11:00\mathrm{AM}$  in DKH 216

### Course Description

Economists typically believe that unless there is a specific reason to expect a market to fail, it will likely work well. In this course, we will try to understand why most economics hold the initial presumption that markets work. In doing so, we will uncover several canonical threats to markets and develop a simple typology of market failures: (i) Externalities and pricing failures, (ii) Participation and inefficient matches, and (iii) Asymmetric information and inefficient allocation. In each case, we will try to understand whether a planner or regulator could alleviate the market failures. That is, we will not limit ourselves to studying existing markets but also think about how to design (or redesign) poorly performing ones. This is known as Mechanism and Market design. We will approach these issues from a theoretical perspective and examine real-world applications.

### Topics covered

We will cover a subset of the following topics.

#### 1. Markets.

- Walrasian Markets
- First Welfare Theorem
- Second Welfare Theorem
- Transaction costs and the Coase Theorem

### 2. Matching Theory

Two-sided markets: Deferred-acceptance
One-sided markets: Top Trading Cycles

#### 3. Adverse Selection and Mechanism Design.

• Market for "lemons"

- Revelation principle
- VCG mechanisms

#### **Evaluation**

I will assign four problem sets during the quarter. Each will consist of 4 questions and be worth 8 points (2 points per question). Any attempted question will give you one point automatically. There will be two midterm exams. The midterms will be open-book. They will consist of problems similar to the one on problem sets and questions on the material we covered. Each will each consisting of 3 questions, worth 6 points each. You will also have to prepare one in-class 30-minute presentation on a topic related to the class by group of (at most) 3. The presentation will be worth 35 points. Finally, participation throughout the class will be graded on 7 points.

For students taking the course for four credit hours only: On top of presentation, you will write a short ( $\sim 5$  pages) paper summary of your presentation that include a formal model/description of the problem you study; i.e., who are the "players", what do they do, what assumptions would you make, what the mechanism looks like, do you think it can be improved upon, ...

Your semester grade will computed as follows: I will sum your grade on the problem sets, your two midterm grades, the grade on your presentation, and your participation grade to obtain your individual score. Your grade will be the minimum of your obtained score and 100. This means that there is a minimum of 10 bonus points for the class.

Neither the grading scale (how numerical scores translate to letter grades) nor the distribution of final grades is fixed ahead of time. Letter grades depend on a mix of absolute and relative performance. Therefore, I cannot show a fixed grading scale or a target grade distribution ahead of time. However, I expect a semester grade of over 90 to translate to an A, over 80 to translate to a B, and over 65 to translate to a C.

(Again remember that this is my expectation prior to the class. The final cutoffs between grades may vary significantly from these expected cutoffs depending on the difficulty of the midterm and problem sets I come up with, and on the class performance.)

### Prerequisites

The formal prerequisites are ECON 302, ECON 437, and MATH 220/221. Technically speaking, only a basic knowledge of elementary calculus and probability theory is required. However, this class can be abstract. You should feel comfortable with standard mathematical reasoning.

### Readings

Slides will be posted before class. Along with the problem sets, they will contain all the material you are responsible for. As the class progresses, I will also suggest additional blog posts, news articles, research articles, and podcasts, which you will find on Canvas. These readings are optional (in that you are not required to do them to pass the class). However, they may be useful to master the material. And I certainly do not expect that you will memorize and digest the entire articles. What I suggest is that you read the Abstract, Introduction and Conclusion so that you can answer the following questions:

- What is the research question?
- How did the authors go about answering the question (i.e., what was the research design)?
- What conclusions did they reach?

Class schedule (subject to changes)

Week	Date	Topic	Important
		Introduction	
1	1/21	Regulation in Markets, The Minimum Wage Debate	
		Suggested Readings: "The Economist as Engineer" by Alvin	
		Roth	
	1/23	The Minimum Wage Debate (continued)	
		Suggested Readings: Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger.	
		"Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the	
		Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania." The	
		American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (1994): 772–93; Naidu,	
		Suresh, and Eric A. Posner. "Labor Monopsony and the	
		Limits of the Law." Journal of Human Resources 57.S (2022):	
		S284-S323.	
2	1/28	Welfare Economics: Social Choice, Pareto Efficiency	HW1 posted
	,	Suggested Readings: "The Olympics of Voting", Forbes, July	_
		16, 2012	
		When are Markets Efficient?	
	1/30	Walrasian Markets, Competitive Equilibrium, Edgeworth	
		Box	
3	2/4	Why do economists like markets? First and Second Welfare	
		Theorems	
	2/6	Application: Gains from Trade in Kerala	
		Suggested Readings: Jensen, Robert. "The Digital Provide:	
		Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare	
		in the South Indian Fisheries Sector." The Quarterly Journal	
		of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 879–924.	
4	2/11	Uncertainty: Asset Markets and Market for Risk	HW1 due
	2/13	Game Theory Review	HW2 posted
		Suggested Readings: Tadelis, Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7, and 12	
5	2/18	Market failures: Externalities, Coase Theorem	
		Suggested Readings: Coase, Ronald Harry. "The problem of	
		social cost." The journal of Law and Economics 56.4 (2013):	
		837-877; McCloskey, Deirdre. "The so-called Coase theo-	
		rem." Eastern Economic Journal 24.3 (1998): 367-371; Horn-	
		beck, Richard. "Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricul-	
		tural Development." The Quarterly Journal of Economics	
		125, no. 2 (2010): 767–810.	
	2/20	Market failures: Gaming and Market Power	
		Suggested Readings: Budish, Eric, Peter Cramton, and John	
		Shim. "Implementation details for frequent batch auctions:	
		Slowing down markets to the blink of an eye." American Eco-	
		nomic Review 104.5 (2014): 418-424; Budish, Eric, Robin S.	
		Lee, and John J. Shim. "A Theory of Stock Exchange Com-	
		petition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?."	
		Journal of Political Economy 132.4 (2024): 1209-1246.	
6	2/25	No class	No class -
		First in class midterm	HW2 due
			Midterm 1

		Moral Limitations of Markets and Matching	
7	3/4	Inequalities, Fairness, and Social Responsibility	
		Suggested Readings: Falk, A. and Szech, N. (2013). Morals	
		and markets. science, 340(6133):707–711	
	3/6	What money cannot buy: Market without money	
	,	Suggested Readings: Sandel, M. J. (2000). What money	
		can't buy: the moral limits of markets. Tanner Lectures	
		on Human Values, 21:87–122	
8	3/11	National Resident Matching Program, and the Deferred Ac-	Form groups
Ü	0/11	ceptance Algorithm (DAA)	for presenta-
		coptuned riigoritiiiii (Briri)	tions
		Suggested Readings: Roth, Alvin E. "The origins, history,	UOIIS
		and design of the resident match." Jama 289.7 (2003): 909-	
		912.	
	9/19		HW9 posted
	3/13	Stable matching  Supported Readings, David Cale and Lloyd Shanlay (1962)	HW3 posted
		Suggested Readings: David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962),	
		"College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage" Ameri-	
	0./4.0	can Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.	3.T 1
9	3/18	Spring break	No class
	3/20	Spring break	No class
10	3/25	Multi-to-one matching	Choose pre-
			sentation
			$\mathbf{topics}$
	3/27	One-sided matching: School choice, kidney exchange	
		Suggested Readings: Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and M.	
		Utku Ünver (2003) "Kidney Exchange" Quarterly Journal of	
		Economics,	
11	4/1	No class	No class +
11	4/1		No class + HW3 due
11	$\begin{vmatrix} 4/1 \\ 4/3 \end{vmatrix}$		No class + HW3 due Midterm 2
	4/3	No class  Second in class midterm  Asymmetric Information	${ m HW3~due}$
11	,	No class  Second in class midterm  Asymmetric Information  Adverse Selection and Market Failure	${ m HW3~due}$
	4/3	No class  Second in class midterm  Asymmetric Information	HW3 due
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		Presentations		
14	4/22	Student Presentations	Send	final
			slides	
	4/24	Student Presentations		
15	4/29	Student Presentations		
	5/1	Student Presentations		
16	5/6	Student Presentations	HW4 dı	ue

This is not an easy course, so do not despair if you struggle; so do I. But:

If you need help understanding expectations, assignments, or instruction, please speak up or come and see me. I care a lot about not leaving anybody behind.

### Academic Assistance

Students are encouraged to utilize the many resources we have throughout campus to assist with academics. We recommend that you seek them out starting early in the semester, not just in times of academic need, in order to develop good study habits and submit work which represents your full academic potential. Many resources are found on the Economics Website including details about the Economics Tutoring Center, Academic Advising, and other academic support options: https://economics.illinois.edu/academics/undergrad uate-program/academic-student-support.

## Academic Integrity

According to the Student Code, "It is the responsibility of each student to refrain from infractions of academic integrity, from conduct that may lead to suspicion of such infractions, and from conduct that aids others in such infractions." Please know that it is my responsibility as an instructor to uphold the academic integrity policy of the University, which can be found here: https://studentcode.illinois.edu/article1/part4/1-401/.

Academic dishonesty may result in a failing grade. Every student is expected to review and abide by the Academic Integrity Policies. It is your responsibility to read this policy to avoid any misunderstanding. Do not hesitate to ask the instructor(s) if you are ever in doubt about what constitutes plagiarism, cheating, or any other breach of academic integrity. Read the full Student Code at https://studentcode.illinois.edu/.

### Students with Disabilities

To obtain disability-related academic adjustments and/or auxiliary aids, students with disabilities must contact the course instructor and the Disability Resources and Educational Services (DRES) as soon as possible. To contact DRES you may visit 1207 S. Oak St., Champaign, call 333-4603 (V/TTY), or e-mail a message to disability@illinois.edu. DRES Website: www.disability.illinois.edu/.

# Community of Care

As members of the Illinois community, we each have a responsibility to express care and concern for one another. If you come across a classmate whose behavior concerns you, whether in regards to their well-being or yours, we encourage you to refer this behavior to the Student Assistance Center (217-333-0050 or http://odos.illinois.edu/community-of-care/referral/). Based on your report, the staff in the Student Assistance Center reaches out to students to make sure they have the support they need to be healthy and safe. Further,

we understand the impact that struggles with mental health can have on your experience at Illinois. Significant stress, strained relationships, anxiety, excessive worry, alcohol/drug problems, a loss of motivation, or problems with eating and/or sleeping can all interfere with optimal academic performance. We encourage all students to reach out to talk with someone, and we want to make sure you are aware that you can access mental health support at the Counseling Center (https://counselingcenter.illinois.edu/) or McKinley Health Center (https://mckinley.illinois.edu/).

For mental health emergencies, you can call 911 or walk into the Counseling Center, no appointment needed.

### Disruptive Behavior

Behavior that persistently or grossly interferes with classroom activities is considered disruptive behavior and may be subject to disciplinary action. Such behavior inhibits other students' ability to learn and an instructor's ability to teach. A student responsible for disruptive behavior may be required to leave class pending discussion and resolution of the problem and may be reported to the Office for Student Conflict Resolution for disciplinary action.

### **Emergency Response Recommendations**

Emergency response recommendations can be found at the following website: http://police.illinois.edu/emergency-preparedness/. I encourage you to review this website and the campus building floor plans website within the first 10 days of class. http://police.illinois.edu/emergency-preparedness/building-emergency-actionplans/.

# Religious Observances

The Religious Observance Accommodation Request form is available at https://odos.illinois.edu/community-of-care/resources/students/religious-observances/. Submit the form to the instructor and to the Office of the Dean of Students (helpdean@illinois.edu) by the end of the second week of the course; in the case of exams or assignments scheduled after this period, students should submit the form to the instructor and to the Office of the Dean of Students as soon as possible. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) Any student who has suppressed their directory information pursuant to Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) should self-identify to the instructor to ensure protection of the privacy of their attendance in this course. See http://registrar.illinois.edu/ferpa for more information on FERPA. Student information and records will not be released to anyone other than the student unless the student has provided written approval or as required by law.

### Sexual Misconduct Reporting Obligation

The University of Illinois is committed to combating sexual misconduct. Faculty and staff members are required to report any instances of sexual misconduct to the University's Title IX and Disability Office. In turn, an individual with the Title IX and Disability Office will provide information about rights and options, including accommodations, support services, the campus disciplinary process, and law enforcement options. A list of the designated University employees who, as counselors, confidential advisors, and medical professionals, do not have this reporting responsibility and can maintain confidentiality, can be found here: http://www.wecare.illinois.edu/resources/students/#confidential. Other information about resources and reporting is available here: http://wecare.illinois.edu/.

## Student Support

The Counseling Center is committed to providing a range of services intended to help students develop improved coping skills in order to address emotional, interpersonal, and academic concerns. Please visit their website to find valuable resources and services: https://counselingcenter.illinois.edu/.

Counseling Center Information: 217-333-3704

Location: Room 206, Student Services Building (610 East John Street, Champaign IL)

McKinley Mental Health Information: 217-333-2705

Location: 3rd Floor McKinley Health Center 1109 South Lincoln, Urbana, IL

Emergency Dean: The Emergency Dean may be reached at (217) 333-0050 and supports students who are experiencing an emergency situation after 5 pm, in which an immediate University response is needed and which cannot wait until the next business day. The Emergency Dean is not a substitute for trained emergency personnel such as 911, Police or Fire. If you are experiencing a life threatening emergency, call 911. Please review the Emergency Dean procedures: http://odos.illinois.edu/emergency/.

### Academic Dates and Deadlines

Students should make note of important academic deadlines for making changes to their courses (add, drop, credit/no-credit, grade replacement, etc.). https://registrar.illinois.edu/academic-calendars

Please check with your academic department regarding specific procedures and policies.

# Acknowledgements

I want to acknowledge the influence of Dan Quint's Markets and Models class at UW Madison and Laura Doval's Market Design class at Caltech on the design of this class.